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Abstract
An important tool for proving safety of dynamical systems is the no-
tion of a barrier certificate. In this paper we prove that every robustly
safe ordinary differential equation has a barrier certificate. Moreover,
we show a construction of such a barrier certificate based on a set of
states that is reachable in finite time.
1 Introduction
An important property of a control system is safety, that is, the property
that the system, when starting from a certain set of initial states, always
stays in a set of safe states. The notion of a barrier certificate [10, 15]
proves safety by separating the set of initial states from the set of states
that are not safe using a transversality condition. This immediately opens
the question whether every safe system has a barrier certificate. In this
paper we give an affirmative answer for robustly safe ordinary differential
equations. The construction is based on an inductive certificate for safety.
Every safe system has such a certificate, but it is formed by a set of states
reachable in unbounded time. As a second result of this paper, we show
that a certain set of states reachable in finite time always forms such an
inductive certificate for safety, as well.
Converse theorems for barrier certificates have received attention since
their introduction. Prajna and Rantzer [11, 12] proved a converse theorem
that holds under some Slater-like condition. Wisniewski and Sloth intro-
duced the idea of exploiting robustness for such a converse theorem [17].
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Their result does not need the Slater-like condition, but is restricted to
Morse-Smale vector fields.
The result in this paper is based on robustness arguments, too. However,
it neither needs a Slater-like condition, nor is restricted to Morse-Smale vec-
tor fields. Moreover, unlike the earlier results, which are based on measure
theory and Morse-Smale theory, respectively, the proofs in this paper are
based on basic mathematical tools, only.
2 Problem Definition
Definition 1. A safety verification problem is a triple (f, I, U) where
• f : Rn → Rn, and f is smooth,
• I ⊆ Rn (the set of initial states), and
• U ⊆ Rn (the set of unsafe states).
The vector field f defines an ordinary differential equation whose solution
we will describe using the flow of f :
Definition 2. For a smooth f : Rn → Rn, and t ∈ R, we denote the state
that system x˙ = f(x) reaches after time t from x by ϕf (x, t).
Note that we also allow t to be negative, and we have ϕ(x, t) = y iff
ϕ(y,−t) = x.
Based on the flow ϕ we introduce the following notation for sets of reach-
able states:
Definition 3. For a smooth f : Rn → Rn, for sets X ⊆ Rn and T ⊆ R,
RTf (X) := {ϕf (x, t) | t ∈ T, x ∈ X}. For t ∈ R, Rtf (X) := R{t}f (X), and
Rf (X) := R
R≥0
f (X).
Here, if clear from the context, we will drop the subscript f .
Definition 4. A safety verification problem (f, I, U) is safe iff Rf (I)∩U =
∅.
In this paper, we are interested in objects that can serve as evidence that
a given safety verification problem is safe. One possibility of such objects is
the following:
Definition 5. A set V ⊆ Rn is a safety certificate of a safety verification
problem (f, I, U) iff
• I ⊆ V
• Rf (V ) ⊆ V
2
• V ∩ U = ∅
A set that fulfills the first two conditions is also called inductive invari-
ant by the verification community, and a positively invariant set by the
dynamical systems literature [7, 5].
Safety certificates serve as a proof of safety:
Property 1. If a safety verification problem (f, I, U) has a safety certificate,
then it is safe.
Safety certificates are also complete, that is, there is a converse of Prop-
erty 1:
Property 2. If a safety verification problem (f, I, U) is safe, then it has a
safety certificate, RR
≥0
f (I).
The definitions presented above are not robust against small changes of
the safety verification problem. For example, a safety verification problem
might have a safety certificate, but tiny changes of the safety verification
problem might result in it not being safe. In order to avoid this, we use
robust analogies of the definitions above. Here we measure deviation from
nominal behavior by the Euclidean norm, denoted by || · ||.
Definition 6. A function x : R≥0 → Rn is an ε-solution of an ordinary
differential equations x˙ = f(x) iff for all t ≥ 0, ||f(x(t))− x˙(t)|| ≤ ε.
We use the following robust versions of the reach sets introduced in
Definition 3:
Definition 7. For a smooth f : Rn → Rn, for sets X ⊆ Rn and T ⊆ R,
RTf,ε(X) := {x(t) | t ∈ T, x is an ε-solution of f with x(0) ∈ X}. For t ∈ R,
Rtf,ε(X) := R
{t}
f,ε (X), and Rf,ε(X) = R
R≥0
f,ε .
Again, if clear from the context, we will drop the subscript f .
Also Definition 4 has a robust version:
Definition 8. A safety verification problem (f, I, U) is robustly safe iff
there is an ε > 0 such that Rf,ε(I) ∩ U = ∅. We will call an ε > 0 fulfilling
this property a robustness margin of (f, I, U).
We also provide a robust version of Definition 5:
Definition 9. A set V ⊆ Rn is an ε-robust safety certificate of a safety
verification problem (f, I, U) iff
• I ⊆ V
• Rf,ε(V ) ⊆ V
3
• V ∩ U = ∅
We call a safety certificate V robust iff there is an ε > 0 such that V is
a ε-robust safety certificate.
There is a robust version of Property 1:
Property 3. If a safety verification problem (f, I, U) has a robust safety
certificate, then it is robustly safe.
Also completeness holds in analogy to Property 2, that is, there is a
converse of Property 3:
Property 4. If a safety verification problem (f, I, U) is robustly safe, then
it has a robust safety certificate, RR
≥0
f,ε (I), where ε is a robustness margin of
(f, I, U).
Safety certificates have the disadvantage that checking them still needs
the computation of a reachable set. This can be avoided by the following
definition.
Definition 10 (Prajna and Jadbabaie [10]). A differentiable function β :
Rn → R is a barrier certificate of a safety verification problem (f, I, U) iff
• ∀x . x ∈ I ⇒ β(x) ≥ 0
• ∀x . β(x) = 0⇒ Lf (β)(x) > 0, that is (∇β(x))T f(x) > 0
• ∀x . β(x) ≥ 0⇒ x 6∈ U
Also barrier certificates serve as a proof of safety:
Property 5. If a safety verification problem (f, I, U) has a barrier certifi-
cate, then it is safe.
Converse theorems for this property are an active area of research [11,
12, 17], and at the same time the main topic of this paper.
Summarizing, Definitions 5, 9, and 10 provide three different forms of
certificates for safety verification problems, as ensured by corresponding
Properties 1, 3, and 5, respectively. The contributions of this paper are
converse theorems for the latter two cases. The state of the art is:
• For Definition 9, there is a very simple converse theorem of the corre-
sponding Property 3. This converse theorem is Property 4 which has
the disadvantage of being based on an infinite-time reach set.
• For Definition 10, it is known that the literal converse of corresponding
Property 5 does not hold, that is, that is, there are safety verification
problems that are safe, but do not have a barrier certificate [15, Ex-
ample 3]. Still, there are partial converse theorems [12, 17]. The most
general result [17] proves a converse for Morse-Smale vector fields un-
der the assumption of robustness.
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The main result of this paper is a converse theorem of Property 5 that
still assumes robustness, but is not restricted to Morse-Smale vector fields:
Theorem 1. Assume a safety verification problem (f, I, U) that is robustly
safe, such that the closures of I and U are disjoint, and the set of safe
states Rn \U is bounded. Then the safety verification problem has a barrier
certificate.
The second result is the following converse of Property 4 that is based
on a finite time reach set:
Theorem 2. If a safety verification problem (f, I, U) is robustly safe with
robustness margin ε and the set of safe states Rn \ U is bounded, then for
all ∆ > 0 there is a t ≥ 0 such that R[0,∆]f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I)) is an
ε
2 -robust safety
certificate.
In the following section we first summarize some facts that directly follow
from the literature. Then, in Section 4 we prove Theorem 1, and in Section 5,
Theorem 2. Section 6 concludes the paper.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we summarize some facts that directly follow from the liter-
ature. We first relate the notion of an ε-solution to controllability:
Property 6. Given a smooth f : Rn → Rn and ∆ > 0, if there is a control
input u : [0,∆]→ [−ε, ε]n s.t. x˙ = f(x) + u(t) has a solution with x(0) = p
and x(∆) = p′, then p′ ∈ R∆f,ε({p}).
Hence we can apply results from controllability to our context. The
following property directly follows from this:
Property 7. Given an ODE x˙ = f(x) with smooth f : Rn → Rn, ε, εˆ with
0 ≤ ε < εˆ, ∆ > 0, p and p′ such that p′ ∈ R∆f,ε({p}), there is a δ > 0 such
that every point in the δ-neighborhood of p′ is in R∆f,εˆ({p}).
The usual proof of (a generalization of) this property [9, Proposition
3.3], [14, Proposition 11.2] uses the inverse function theorem to map each
point p∗ in the neighborhood of p′ to a vector ξ1, . . . , ξn that generates an
input of the form needed by Property 6 to steer the system into p∗. Due to
a version of the inverse function theorem [6, Theorem 2.9.4] that bounds the
size of this neighborhood from below based on a Lipschitz constant for the
derivative of the given function, the size δ of the neighborhood in Property 7
can be bounded from below over all elements p and p′ of a compact set:
Lemma 1. Given an ODE x˙ = f(x) with smooth f : Rn → Rn, and a
compact set Ω ⊆ Rn. Then, for every ε > 0, ∆ > 0 there is a δ > 0
such that for all p, p′ ∈ Ω such that p′ ∈ cl(R∆f, ε
2
({p})), every point in the
δ-neighborhood of p′ is in R∆f,ε({p}).
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4 Robust Converse Theorem for Barrier Certifi-
cates
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1. Throughout the section, we will
assume a safety verification problem (f, I, U) that fulfills the premises of
this theorem: robust safety, disjointness of the closures of I and U , and
boundedness of the set of safe states Rn \ U . We will denote by µ the
robustness margin of (f, I, U), and by V a µ-robust safety certificate whose
existence is ensured by Property 4. We will construct a barrier certificate
from the boundary ∂cl(V ) of the closure of V . We will first prove that the
solutions of f starting in ∂cl(V ) do not have any further intersection with
∂cl(V )—even in reverse time:
Lemma 2. For every x ∈ RRf (∂cl(V )) there is precisely one t ∈ R such that
ϕf (x, t) ∈ ∂cl(V )
Proof. By the definition of RRf (∂cl(V )) there is at least one such t. It suffices
to prove that there is not more than one. For this we assume that there are
t1 and t2 such that t1 6= t2, and both ϕf (x, t1) and ϕf (x, t2) are in ∂cl(V ).
W.l.o.g. assume that t1 < t2. Let tˆ be such that t1 < tˆ < t2.
Then ϕ(x, t2) = ϕ(ϕ(x, tˆ), t2 − tˆ) and so ϕ(x, t2) ∈ Rt2−tˆf,0 ({ϕ(x, tˆ)}).
Therefore, by Property 7, there is a neighborhood of ϕ(x, t2) such that every
point in this neighborhood is µ-reachable from ϕ(x, tˆ). The same argument
applied in reverse time to t1 and tˆ ensures a neighborhood of ϕ(x, t1) such
that ϕ(x, tˆ) is µ-reachable from every point in this neighborhood. Let x1
be in the neighborhood of ϕ(x, t1) such that x1 ∈ V , and let x2 be in the
neighborhood of ϕ(x, t2) such that x2 6∈ V . Then there is a µ-solution from
x1 ∈ V over ϕf (x, tˆ) to x2 6∈ V . This is in contradiction to the fact that V
is a µ-robust safety certificate.
We will now introduce a function ν(x) from which we will later obtain
the barrier certificate by smooth approximation. Let ν(x) be such that ν(x)
is defined on RRf (∂cl(V )) and such that ν(x) := −t with t being the unique
t with ϕf (x, t) ∈ ∂cl(V ) ensured by Lemma 2. Note that ν(x) is positive
for all points of the interior of V for which it is defined and negative for
all points of the complement of the closure of V for which it is defined.
Moreover, ∂cl(V ) is in the interior of the domain of definition of ν. Due to
the definition of ν we also have:
Property 8. For x ∈ RRf (∂cl(V )), ν(ϕ(x, t)) = ν(x) + t.
In general, functions defined based on the length of solutions leading to
some set are not continuous. But using the robustness of V we will be able
to prove continuity:
Lemma 3. The function ν is continuous in an open neighborhood of ∂cl(V ).
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Before formally proving this lemma, we explain the idea of the proof.
We assume that ν is not continuous let us say at a point x, and derive a
contradiction. Let y be the point where the solution from x enters V . Then,
due to non-continuity, the situation shown in Figure 1 arises: There is a point
x′ close to x such that the solution from x′ enters a close neighborhood of
y (point yˆ), but then enters V at a different point further away. Letting
y′ be close to that entrance point but still outside of V we can perturb the
trajectory from yˆ to y′ by moving yˆ to y. The resulting trajectory leads
from y to y′ and hence leaves V which is a contradiction to V being a robust
safety certificate.
Figure 1: Intuition of the Proof of Lemma 3
The figure illustrates the situation where x 6∈ V , but we do not assume
this in the proof by exploiting the fact that the flow ϕ also allows negative
time.
Proof. The function ν being continuous in an open neighborhood of ∂cl(V )
means that for all elements x of this neighborhood, for all ε > 0 there exists
δ > 0 s.t. for all x′ with ||x′ − x|| < δ, |ν(x′) − ν(x)| < ε. We assume
non-continuity of ν in every open neighborhood of ∂cl(V ), and derive a
contradiction.
Since the set of states Rn \ U is bounded and the safety verification
problem (f, I, U) is robustly safe, the safety certificate V is bounded, too.
Let N be an open, but bounded, neighborhood of ∂cl(V ). Due to our
assumption, ν is non-continuous in N , that is, there is an x ∈ N , ε > 0 s.t.
∀δ > 0∃x′ s.t. ||x− x′|| ≤ δ, |ν(x)− ν(x′)| ≥ ε. Choose such an x and ε.
Since N is open, but bounded, cl(N) is compact. Now let δˆ+ be the
constant ensured by Lemma 1 after choosing Ω as cl(N), ε as µ2 , and ∆
as the constant ε chosen above. Let δˆ− be the corresponding constant for
reverse dynamics −f . Choose δˆ = min{δˆ+, δˆ−}. Then for all p, p′ ∈ N
such that p′ ∈ cl(Rε
f,µ
4
({p})), every point in the δˆ-neighborhood of p′ is in
7
Rε
f,µ
2
({p}). Also for all p, p′ ∈ N such that p′ ∈ cl(Rε−f,µ
4
({p})), every point
in the δˆ-neighborhood of p′ is in Rε−f,µ
2
({p}). We note these properties and
refer to them below by (∗)+, and (∗)−, respectively.
Since the flow ϕ is continuous we can choose a δ s.t. for all x′ with
||x− x′|| < δ, ||ϕ(x,−ν(x))− ϕ(x′,−ν(x))|| < δˆ. Due to our assumption of
non-continuity of ν, for this δ there is an x′ s.t. ||x−x′|| ≤ δ, |ν(x)−ν(x′)| ≥
ε.
Let y := ϕf (x,−ν(x)), yˆ := ϕf (x′,−ν(x)), y′ := ϕf (yˆ, sgn(ν(x) −
ν(x′))ε). Then ||y−yˆ|| < δˆ, and y′ = ϕf (ϕf (x′,−ν(x)), sgn(ν(x)−ν(x′))ε) =
ϕf (x
′,−ν(x)+sgn(ν(x)−ν(x′))ε). Hence, by Property 8, ν(y′) = ν(ϕf (x′,−ν(x)+
sgn(ν(x)− ν(x′))ε)) = ν(x′)− ν(x) + sgn(ν(x)− ν(x′))ε.
We have two cases:
• If ν(x)− ν(x′) ≥ 0, then ν(x)− ν(x′) = |ν(x)− ν(x′)| ≥ ε, and
ν(y′) =
ν(x′)− ν(x) + sgn(ν(x)− ν(x′))ε =
−(ν(x)− ν(x′)) + ε ≤ 0.
Since y′ = ϕf (yˆ, sgn(ν(x) − ν(x′))ε) = ϕf (yˆ, ε), yˆ = ϕ−f (y′, ε), and
hence yˆ ∈ cl(Rε−f,µ
4
({y′})). So by Property (∗)− noted above, y ∈
Rε−f,µ
2
({y′}), and so y′ ∈ Rε
f,µ
2
({y}). But ν(y) = 0 and ν(y′) ≤ 0.
Hence y ∈ cl(V ) and y′ 6∈ int(V ).
• If ν(x)− ν(x′) ≤ 0, then −(ν(x)− ν(x′)) = |ν(x)− ν(x′)| ≥ ε, and
ν(y′) =
ν(x′)− ν(x) + sgn(ν(x)− ν(x′))ε =
−(ν(x)− ν(x′))− ε ≥ 0.
Since y′ = ϕf (yˆ, sgn(ν(x) − ν(x′))ε) = ϕf (yˆ,−ε), yˆ = ϕf (y′, ε), and
hence yˆ ∈ cl(Rε
f,µ
4
({y′})). So, by Property (∗)+ noted above, y ∈
Rε
f,µ
2
({y′}). But ν(y′) ≥ 0 and ν(y) = 0. Hence y′ ∈ cl(V ) and
y 6∈ int(V ).
In both cases, we have a µ2 -solution from a point in cl(V ) to a point not
in int(V ). Hence, using the same construction as in the second part of the
proof of Lemma 2 above, one gets a µ-solution from a point in V to a point
not in V which is a contradiction to the fact that V is a µ-robust safety
certificate.
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Using the notation
(Lfν)(x) := lim
h→0
ν(ϕf (x, h))− ν(x)
h
we now remind the reader of a classical result by W. Wilson [16, Theo-
rem 2.5], and for the reader’s convenience, we state here a direct corollary:
Lemma 4. If h is a continuous real-valued function on a compact set N , f
is a non-singular vector field on N , and Lfh is defined on N and continuous,
then for every ε > 0 there exists a C∞-function h′ : N → R such that for
all x ∈ N ,
|h(x)− h′(x)| < ε
and
(Lfh′)(x) > (Lfh)(x)− ε.
Based on this, we can now construct a robust barrier certificate from the
robust safety certificate V :
Lemma 5. There is a differentiable function β : Rn → R and ε > 0 such
that
• ∀x . x ∈ I ⇒ β(x) > ε
• ∀x . |β(x)| ≤ ε⇒ Lf (β)(x) > ε, that is (∇β(x))T f(x) > ε
• ∀x . x ∈ U ⇒ β(x) < ε
Proof. From the ε-robust safety certificate V we can construct a function
ν as above. The zero set {x | ν(x) = 0} is equal to ∂cl(V ), and hence it
intersects neither I nor U . Moreover, f is non-singular on this set. For all
δ ∈ R≥0, let Nδ := {x | |ν(x)| ≤ δ}. Now let 0 < δ < 12 be such that the
δ-sublevel set Nδ still intersects neither I nor U , f is non-singular on Nδ,
and Nδ is contained in the open neighborhood of ∂cl(V ) for which Lemma 3
ensures continuity of ν.
Now observe that for all x ∈ Nδ,
(Lfν)(x) =
lim
h→0
ν(ϕf (x, h))− ν(x)
h
=
lim
h→0
ν(x) + h− ν(x)
h
= 1.
Further, due to continuity of ν we can use Lemma 4 to construct a
C∞-function ν ′ such that for all x ∈ Nδ,
|ν(x)− ν ′(x)| < δ
2
9
and
(Lfν ′)(x) > (Lfν)(x)− δ
2
,
Then for all x ∈ Nδ, (Lfν ′)(x) > 1− δ2 > 0, and for all x 6∈ N δ
2
, ν ′(x) 6= 0.
Now let X = (Xα)α∈A be an open cover of Rn indexed by a set A.
Assume furthermore, that for all α ∈ A, Xα contains a common element
with at most one of the sets N δ
2
, {x | ν(x) ≥ δ}, and {x | ν(x) ≤ −δ}. Let
(βα)α∈A be a family of functions s.t. for each α ∈ A, and x ∈ Rn,
βα(x) :=

δ, if Xα ∩ {x | ν(x) ≥ δ} 6= ∅,
−δ, if Xα ∩ {x | ν(x) ≤ −δ} 6= ∅,
ν ′(x), otherwise.
Let (ψα)α∈A be a partition of unity [8, Chapter 2] sub-ordinate to X and
β(x) :=
∑
α∈A
ψα(x)βα(x).
Since (ψα)α∈A is a partition of unity, β is smooth. Since for all α ∈ A,
for all x 6∈ N δ
2
, βα(x) 6= 0, β is non-zero outside of N δ
2
. Since β coincides
with ν ′ on N δ
2
, for all x ∈ N δ
2
, (Lfβ)(x) > 0. Moreover, β is strictly positive
on I, and strictly negative on U . The existence of a bound ε > 0 follows
due to continuity of β and compactness of all relevant sets.
Theorem 1 follows as a corollary.
5 Finite Time Converse Theorem for Safety Cer-
tificates
The construction in the previous section was based on a robust safety cer-
tificate V whose existence is ensured by Property 4. However, this property
has the disadvantage of being based on an infinite time reach set. We will
remove this disadvantage by proving Theorem 2 in the next section.
The proof extends a technique introduced by M. Fra¨nzle [3], that he
originally used for proving existence of a barrier for hybrid systems with
polynomial flow: Take the bloated finite-time reach set R
[0,t]
f,ε (I), and show
that the original dynamics is shrinking on it if the bloated reach set does
not grow beyond the bounded complement of U . However, here we have
additional complications: First, our flow is, in general, not polynomial (note
that even linear ODEs usually have a non-polynomial flow), and second, we
are not satisfied with a barrier, but we want a robust barrier.
Before the actual proof, we note:
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Lemma 6. Let V ⊆ Rn, ∆ > 0 such that
R∆f,ε(V ) ⊆ V.
Then for all ∆′ ≥ ∆,
Rf,ε(R
[0,∆′]
f,ε (V )) ⊆ R[0,∆
′]
f,ε (V ).
Proof. Let p ∈ Rf,ε(R[0,∆
′]
f,ε (V )). We prove that p is also in R
[0,∆′]
f,ε (V ).
Let σ be the ε-solution leading from a point in V to p, and let τ be the
length of this solution. So σ(0) ∈ V and σ(τ) = p. Since R∆f,ε(V ) ⊆ V , also
σ(∆) ∈ V . In general, for every i, σ(i∆) ∈ V . Let b be the maximal i with
i∆ < τ . Then 0 ≤ τ − b∆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆′, and hence p ∈ Rτ−b∆f,ε ({σ(b∆)}) ⊆
R
[0,∆′]
f,ε ({σ(b∆)}) ⊆ R[0,∆
′]
f,ε (V ).
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2:
Proof. We assume that (f, I, U) is robustly safe with robustness margin ε,
and the complement of U is bounded. We derive a contradiction from the
additional assumption that there exists ∆ > 0 such that for all t ≥ 0,
R
[0,∆]
f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I)) is no
ε
2 -robust safety certificate.
We first observe that for every t ≥ 0, R[0,t]f,ε (I) 6⊇ R∆f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I)). Oth-
erwise, due to Lemma 6, Rf, ε
2
(R
[0,∆]
f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I))) ⊆ R[0,∆]f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I)), and
R
[0,∆]
f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I)) would be a
ε
2 -robust safety certificate, which would be in
contradiction to the assumption above.
We now derive a contradiction from the above by constructing an infinite
sequence of points p1, . . . , such that
• for every i, pi ∈ R[0,∞]f,ε (I), and
• for every i, j, i 6= j, we have ||pj − pi|| > δ,
with δ being a positive real number. This implies that the maximal distance
of two points in the sequence grows over all bounds. Since the complement
of U is bounded, this is a contradiction to the fact that (f, I, U) is robustly
safe.
We ensure the second property (sufficient distance of points) by con-
structing at the same time a sequence t1, . . . , such that, for all i,
• every point not ε-reachable in time ti, that is, every point not in
R
[0,ti]
f,ε (I) has distance at least δ from every point p1, . . . , pi (in Figure 2,
the δ-balls around pi are inside of the reach sets R
[0,ti]
f,ε (I)).
• pi+1 is not ε-reachable in time ti, that is, pi+1 6∈ R[0,ti]f,ε (I) (in Figure 2,
the points p′ = pi+1 are outside of the reach sets R
[0,ti]
f,ε (I)).
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Figure 2: Proof Intuition
It remains to construct the sequences p1, . . . , and t1, . . . , in such a way.
Due to the Heine-Borel theorem, the closure of the complement of U is
compact. So we can apply Lemma 1: Let δ be as given by Lemma 1 for Ω
being the closure of the complement of U . Let i be an arbitrary, but fixed
natural number, and assume that the above properties hold for p1, . . . , pi
and t1, . . . , ti. We construct pi+1, ti+1 together with a proof that the above
properties hold for them.
For this, let p ∈ R[0,ti]f,ε (I), p′ 6∈ R[0,ti]f,ε (I) s.t. p′ is ε2 -reachable in time
∆ from p which exist since for all t ≥ 0, R[0,t]f,ε (I) 6⊇ R∆f, ε
2
(R
[0,t]
f,ε (I)). By
Lemma 1 every point in the δ-neighborhood of p′ is reachable in time ∆
from p ∈ R[0,ti]f,ε (I) with ε-perturbed dynamics.
So we choose pi+1 = p
′, ti+1 = ti + ∆. Then pi+1 6∈ R[0,ti]f,ε (I), and hence
has distance at least δ from p1, . . . , pi. Moreover, every point not reachable
in time ti+1 again has distance at least δ from p1, . . . , pi+1.
We choose t1 = 0 and p1 an initial point that has distance at least δ
from the boundary of the set of initial points I (the case where such a point
does not exist can be easily handled by shifting the sequence).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proved a robust converse theorem for barrier certificates, re-
moving restrictions of such theorems in the literature. Moreover, we proved
that a certain finite time reach set of a robustly safe system always forms
a robust safety certificate. The literature contains several variants of the
notion of a barrier certificate [15, 4]. We propose a comprehensive converse
12
theory covering those variants as a goal for future work in the area.
The actual computation of barrier certificates [1, 2, 18, 13] is an essential
question that deserves further attention.
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